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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CRIMINAL LAW-FAILURE OF AccusED TO TEsTIFY--EXTENT OF
JUDGE'S INSTRUCTION IN FEDERAL COURTS-In a prosecution against defendant for violation of the White Slave Traffic Act,1 the trial judge instructed
the jury that defendant's failure to testify should not be considered by them
in determining his guilt or innocence. On appeal from conviction, held, there
was no error in this instruction. United States v. Fleenor, ( C.C.A. 7th, 194 7)

162 F. (2d) 935.

·

The extent to which the court may refer to the accused's failure to testify
is restricted by .the constitutional and statutory limitations existing in the jurisdiction. 2 In federal criminal proceedings, the defendant's privilege from un-

18 u.s.c. (1940) § 398.
Reeder, "Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify," 31 M1cH. L. REV. 40
(1932); Smith, "Right to Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify," 18 NEB.
L. BUL. 204 (1939).
1

2

RECENT DECISIONS

685

favorable comment arises primarily from a construction of the act of Congress 8
making him a competent witness, rather than from an interpretation of the
prohibition against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment.4 The statute
forbids a presumption of guilt from defendant's silence, and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure do not alter this.5 It is clear that both the prosecutor
and the judge are restrained from commenting during the trial on any subject
suggesting to the jury that defendant's failure to testify may be considered.6
The related problem of whether or not the judge may give even a favorable
instruction on defendant's silence, or whether this in itself will be prejudicial,
has not been solved. Under the fedei:,al statute and similarly worded state
statutes, the accused is entitled to a statement by the judge, instructing the jury
that his failure to take the stand is not to be construed against him.7 Failure
to give this instruction on request is reversible error. 8 Some courts have suggested that it is better for the trial judge to say nothing about this matter
unless requested by the defendant, although the determination of prejudice will
still be on the instruction itself.9 Generally, therefore, the judge may instruct
on his own accord.10 The instruction is acceptable if it is put in the words
of the statute, or is not otherwise prejudicial to the defendant.11 When the
court merely repeated the four concluding lines of the statute, there was no
error.12 A charge that such failure to testify was "not to be considered by the
jury in any respect whatsoever" was held not to be error.18 A similar instruction "that no presumption of guilt or innocence arises from the mere fact that
the defendant did not testify in his own behalf" was considered not objection•
able.14 Instruction that goes beyond the intended meaning of the statute will be
3
28 U.S.C. (1940) § 632: " • ·.• And his failure to make such request shall
not create any presumption against him."
4
Swope, "Constitutionality of a Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify,"
37 M1cH. L. REV. 777 (1939); Bruce, "Right to Comment on Failure of Defendant
to Testify," 31 M1cH. L. REV. 226 (1932).
11
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26 (March 21, 1946).
6
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 13 S.Ct. 765 (1893); Grantello v.
United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1924) 3 F. (2d) I 17; Lindenv United States, (C.C.A.
3d, 1924) 296 F. 104; 68 A.L.R. no8 (1930); 94 A.L.R. 701 (1935).
7
Hanish v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th, 1915) 227 F. 584; Stout v. United
States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1915) 227 F. 799; Michael v. United States, (C.C.A. 7th,
1925) 7 F. (2d) 865.
8
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 536, 60 S.Ct. n2 (1939); Hersh v. United
States, (C.C.A. 9th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 799.
9
Becher v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1924) 5 F. (2d) 45; Kahn v. United
States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 782.
10
Robilio v. United States, (C.C.A. 6th, 1919) 259 F. IOI.
11
Jenkins v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 556; Smith v.
United States, 72 App. D.C. 187, n2 F. (2d) 217 (1940); Chadwick v. United
States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) n7 F. (2d) 902; Boehm v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th,
1941) 123 F. (2d) 791.
12
United States v. Brookman, (D.C. Minn. 1924) l F. (2d) 528.
18
Kreuzer v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1918) 254 F. 34
14
Affronti v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 3.
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error,1 5 but, when no exception is taken and there is no obvious miscarriage of
justice, this is not necessarily reversible error. 16 The defendant is thus given an
extensive protection in his failure to take the stand and testify. While not
protected to the extent that the judge may instruct only on his request, the
accused is effectively shielded from all unfavorable comment to which timely
exception is made at trial. Not until he voluntarily becomes a witness and
testifies to the merits of the case is this aegis removed.17
Carson C. Grunewald

15 Grantello v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1924) 3 F. (2d) 117; Linden v.
United States, (C.C.A. 3d, 1924) 296 F. 104.
16 Nobile v. United States, (C.C.A. 3d, 1922) 284 F. 253.
17 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192 (1917); 36 HARV.
L. REV. 207 (1923).
'

